Researched from original-language primary sources, this is a uniquely well-informed and multi-faceted history of the World War I air campaign of Bloody April. Researched from original German-, French-, and English-language sources, and written by an authority on both air and ground military operations, author, Dr James S Corum examines how Bloody April caused Allied forces to reassess their approach to the use of airpower. Considering well-known problems such as technology and training doctrine, but also how the artillery-aircraft combination ideally had to work in late-WW I ground offensives, Dr Corum analyses what each side got wrong and why. He describes little-known parts of the April campaigns, such as both sides' use of strategic bombing with heavy aircraft, and considers the German use of advanced high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft with oxygen and heated suits while detailing the exploits of the infamous 'Red Baron', Manfred von Richthofen. Lessons from Bloody April not only served to improve the coordination of Allied artillery and aircraft but subsequently aircraft played a much larger role in supporting ground troops in attack mode. Bloody April paved the way for the airpower revolution that, by 1918, would make the Allies masters of the sky on the Western Front.

The German invasion of Norway was a pivotal moment in modern warfare, the first joint campaign that featured air power as an equal element of all operations. It was, in fact, the superior use of their air force that gave the Germans the decisive margin of victory and ensured the failure of the Allied counter-offensive in central Norway in April and May 1940. All aspects of air power were employed in Norway, from long-range bombing and reconnaissance to air transport, with the Luftwaffe's ability to transport large numbers of troops and supply ground forces over great distances being particularly important. Norway was the first campaign in history in which key targets were seized by airborne forces, and the first in which air superiority was able to overcome the overwhelming naval superiority of an enemy. Researched from primary sources, this engaging history by air power expert Dr James Corum skilfully draws out where and why air power made the difference in Norway, and analyses the campaign's influence on the coming months and years of World War II.

Compared to armies and navies, which have existed as professional fighting services for centuries, the technology that makes air forces possible is much newer. As a result, these services have had to quickly develop methods of preparing aviators to operate in conditions ranging from peace or routine security to full-scale war. The first book to address the history and scope of air power professionalization through learning programs, Educating Air Forces offers valuable new insight into strategy and tactics worldwide. Here, a group of international experts examine the philosophies, policies, and practices of air service educational efforts in the United States, France, Italy, Germany, Australia, Canada, and the UK. First, the contributors discuss the founding, successes, and failures of European air force learning programs between the Great War and World War II. Chapters in section two explore how the tense political climate during the Cold War influenced the creation, curriculum, and results of various programs. The final section addresses the post--Cold War era, specifically examining how educational programs are adapting to soldiers' needs and the demands of modern warfare. Featuring contributions from eminent scholars in the field, this volume surveys the learning approaches globally employed by air forces in the past century and evaluates their effectiveness. Educating Air Forces reveals how experiential learning and formal education are not only inextricably intertwined, but also necessary to cope with advances in modern warfare.

The bombing of Guernica has become a symbol of Nazi involvement in the Spanish Civil War, but the extent of the German commitment is often underestimated. The Luftwaffe sent 20,000 officers and men to Spain from 1936 to 1939, and the Condor Legion carried out many missions in support of the Spanish Nationalist forces and played a lead role in many key campaigns of the war. Aircraft that would play a significant role in the combat operations of World War II (the Heinkel 11 bomber, the Me 109 fighter, and others) saw their first action in Spain, fighting against the modern Soviet fighters and bombers that equipped the Republican Air Force. Condor Legion bombers attacked Republican logistics and transport behind the lines as well as bombing strategic targets, German bombers and fighters provided highly effective close air support for the front-line troops, and German fighters and anti-aircraft units ensured Nationalist control of the air. The experience garnered in Spain was very important to the development of the Luftwaffe. The war allowed them to hone and develop their tactics, train their officers, and to become the most practised air force in the world at conducting close support of ground troops. In effect, the Spanish Civil War proved to be the training ground for the Blitzkrieg which would be unleashed across Europe in the years that followed. In this rigorous new analysis, Legion Condor expert James Corum explores both the history and impact of the Luftwaffe's engagement during the Spanish Civil War and the role that engagement played in the development of the Luftwaffe strategy which would be used to such devastating effect in the years that followed.

Luftwaffe commander Wolfram von Richthofen was a brilliant master of the tactical and operational air war and one of the key catalysts in the resurrection of Germany's air force. Long overshadowed in history by his cousin, World War I's famous "Red Baron," von Richthofen served in seven major air campaigns from 1936 to 1944, and as senior air commander he was always at the center of the action. For this first full-length biography of von Richthofen, James Corum has mined the field marshal's extensive diaries, which provide a detailed record of military campaigns, tactical and operational problems, interactions with other commanders, and his assessment of methods and weaponry. He has also drawn on interviews with former Luftwaffe members and on his unparalleled access to von Richthofen family papers and photos. Corum reveals how, before World War II, von Richthofen played a central role in developing and building the Luftwaffe and such famous aircraft as the Me 109 fighter and He 111 bomber. He then delivered tactical and operational successes in the Spanish Civil War, where he established the close air support tactics that became an essential trademark of the German blitzkrieg. As commander of the Special Air Division in the invasion of Poland, he demonstrated the effectiveness of massed airpower and in 1940 helped produce a dramatic German victory in France by providing close air support for Von Kleist's panzer divisions as they raced to the English Channel. Later he also led the Luftwaffe's Second Air Fleet against the Allied landings in Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio. Providing a fully rounded portrait, Corum also cites von Richthofen's signal defeats in the Battle of Britain and around Stalingrad; depicts his arrogant and ruthless tendencies; and reveals his loyal but nave belief in Hitler. Cutting through the myths that have grown around von Richthofen's life, Corum's study fills a major gap in the literature and offers new insight into German military culture, Hitler's strategic thinking, and their impact on the German way of war.

World War I had a profound impact on the United States of America, which was forced to 'grow' an army almost overnight. The day the United States declared war on Germany, the US Army was only the 17th largest in the world, ranking behind Portugal - the Regular Army had only 128,00 troops, backed up by the National Guard with some 182,000 troops. By the end of the war it had grown to 3,700,000, with slightly more than half that number in Europe. Until the United States did so, no country in all history had tried to deploy a 2-million-man force 3,000 miles from its own borders, a force led by American Expeditionary Forces Commander-in-Chief General John J. Pershing. This was America's first truly modern war and rising from its ranks was a new generation of leaders who would control the fate of the United States armed forces during the interwar period and into World War II. This book reveals the history of the key leaders working for and with John J. Pershing during this tumultuous period, including George S. Patton (tank commander and future commander of the US Third Army during World War II); Douglas MacArthur (42nd Division commander and future General of the Army) and Harry S. Truman (artillery battery commander and future President of the United States). Edited by Major General David T. Zabecki (US Army, Retired) and Colonel Douglas V. Mastriano (US Army, Retired), this fascinating title comprises chapters on individual leaders from subject experts across the US, including faculty members of the US Army War College.

At the end of World War I, the German military machine lay devastated, forbidden any attempt to rebuild. But by the dawn of World War II, its army and air forces had both been rejuvenated to sufficient vigor to conquer most of Europe. As James Corum shows, the Luftwaffe's dramatic resurrection underscored the remarkable success of Germany's visionary interwar planning.

A superb example of both military and intellectual history, Corum's study provides a complete and accurate account of the evolution of German military aviation theory, doctrine, war games, and operations between the two world wars. It reveals how the Germans, in defiance of Versailles, thoroughly studied and tested the lessons of World War I, analyzed the emerging air doctrines of other nations, and experimented with innovative aviation technology to create the world's most powerful air force by 1940.

Drawing heavily upon archival sources, Corum discloses the debates within the General Staff-led by the likes of Hans van Seeckt, Helmuth Wilberg, Wolfram von Richthofen, and Walter Wever-about the future role of airpower and the problems of aligning aviation technology with air doctrine. He challenges previous accounts and demolishes a number of myths, for example demonstrating that Germany did not dismiss the potential of strategic bombing or embrace terror bombing of civilian populations, and was not heavily influenced by its popular culture's romance with aviation.

Corum also illuminates Germany's comprehensive approach to highly mobile combined-arms warfare, its secret research and training in the Soviet Union, and its remarkable successes during the Spanish Civil War. While focusing primarily on the interwar period, he extends his analysis into the early years of World War II to examine the Luftwaffe's effectiveness in Poland and France, and expose its flaws in the Battle of Britain.

As a companion to Corum's acclaimed study of the German army between the wars, "The Luftwaffe" reminds us how operational doctrine, combined with one of the greatest fighting forces ever assembled, indelibly altered the fate of nations.

Following Germany's defeat in World War I, the Germans signed the Versailles Treaty, superficially agreeing to limit their war powers. The Allies envisioned the future German army as a lightly armed border guard and international security force. The Germans had other plans.

As early as 1919, James Corum contends, the tactical foundations were being laid for the Nazi Blitzkrieg. Between 1919 and 1933, German military leaders created and nurtured the Reichswehr, a new military organization built on the wreckage of the old Imperial Army. It was not being groomed for policing purposes.

Focusing on Hans von Seeckt, General Staff Chief and Army Commander, Corum traces the crucial transformations in German military tactical doctrine, organization, and training that laid the foundations for fighting Germany's future wars. In doing so, he restores balance to prior assessment of von Seeckt's influence and demonstrates how the general, along with a few other "visionary" officers--including armor tactician Ernst Volckheim and air tactician Helmut Wilberg--collaborated to develop the core doctrine for what became the Blitzkrieg.

The concepts of mobile war so essential to Germany's strength in World War II, Corum shows, were in place well before the tools became available. As an unforeseen consequence of the Versailles Treaty, the Germans were not saddled with a stockpile of outdated equipment as the Allies were. This, ironically, resulted in an advantage for the Germans, who were able to create doctrine first and design equipment to match it.

The use of airpower in wartime calls to mind the massive bombings of World War II, but airplanes have long been instrumental in small wars as well. Ever since its use by the French to put down rebellious Moroccan tribes in 1913, airpower has been employed to fight in limited but often lengthy small conflicts around the globe. This is the first comprehensive history of airpower in small wars-conflicts pitting states against non-state groups such as insurgents, bandits, factions, and terrorists-tracing it from the early years of the twentieth century to the present day. It examines dozens of conflicts with strikingly different scenarios: the Greek Civil War, the Philippine Anti-Huk campaign, French and British colonial wars, the war in South Vietnam before the American escalation, counterinsurgency in southern Africa, Latin American counterguerrilla operations, and counterinsurgency and counterterrorist campaigns in the Middle East over the last four decades. For each war, the authors describe the strategies employed on both sides of the conflict, the air forces engaged, and the specific airpower tactics employed. They discuss the ground campaigns and provide the political background necessary to understand the air campaigns, and in each case they judge the utility of airpower in its broadest sense. In their historic sweep, they show how forms of airpower evolved from planes to police helicopters, aircraft of the civilian air reserve, and today's unmanned aircraft. They also disclose how small wars after World War II required new strategies, operational solutions, and tactics. By taking this broad view of small-war airpower, the authors are able to make assessments about the most effective and least effective means of employing airpower. They offer specific conclusions ranging from the importance of comprehensive strategy to the need for the United States and its allies to expand small-wars training programs. Airpower in Small Wars will be invaluable for educating military professionals and policy makers in the subject as well as for providing a useful framework for developing more effective doctrine for employing airpower in the conflicts we are most likely to see in the twenty-first century.

This monograph examines the British experience in building and training indigenous police and military forces during the Malaya and Cyprus insurgencies. The two insurgencies provide a dramatic contrast to the issue of training local security forces. In Malaya, the British developed a very successful strategy for training the Malayan police and army. In Cyprus, the British strategy for building and training local security forces generally was ineffective. The author argues that some important lessons can be drawn from these case studies that apply directly to current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. The research for this monograph was carried out while the author was a visiting fellow of All Souls College, Oxford University. The author used the superb library and archive of the Rhodes House Centre for Imperial and Commonwealth History at Oxford University. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this contribution to the current debate on counterinsurgency doctrine.

This monograph examines the British experience in building and training indigenous police and military forces during the Malaya and Cyprus insurgencies. The two insurgencies provide a dramatic contrast to the issue of training local security forces. In Malaya, the British developed a very successful strategy for training the Malayan police and army. In Cyprus, the British strategy for building and training local security forces generally was ineffective. The author argues that some important lessons can be drawn from these case studies that apply directly to current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. The research for this monograph was carried out while the author was a visiting fellow of All Souls College, Oxford University. The author used the superb library and archive of the Rhodes House Centre for Imperial and Commonwealth History at Oxford University. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this contribution to the current debate on counterinsurgency doctrine.

Developing coalition security strategies within NATO has never been easy. However, it does help to have a thorough understanding of one's allies and their concerns and perspectives. This monograph provides an in depth view of how three Baltic nations (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) view current and future security threats and likely problems. It recommends some ways in which the United States might respond to these issues.

If the United States is likely to fight in a coalition with small allies in the future, then it is useful to understand the experience, capabilities, and perspectives of those allies. Since regaining independence in 1991, the countries of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania have been very active in supporting NATO and U.S. military operations abroad. It is notable that the three Baltic countries have also used the deployment of a significant part of their forces in the last decade as a major part of their program to carry out a major force transformation.

The primary issue is to examine the historical perspective that air bombardment necessarily results in high numbers of civilian casualties. I will examine how the reports of civilian casualties have generally been inflated. Finally, I will examine how perceptions on bombing and civilians are likely to influence the behavior of the political and media elites.

In 2018, the world will be commemorating the centenary of the end of the First World War. In many ways, 1918 was the most dramatic year of the conflict. After the defeat of Russia in 1917, the Germans were able to concentrate their forces on the Western Front for the first time in the war, and the German offensives launched from March 1918 onward brought the Western Allies close to defeat. Having stopped the German offensives, the Entente started its counter-attacks on all fronts with the assistance of fresh US troops, driving the Germans back and, by November 1918, the Central Powers had been defeated.

This new study is a multi-author work containing ten chapters by some of the best historians of the First World War from around the world writing today. It provides an overview and analysis of the different levels of war for each of the main armies involved within the changing context of the reality of warfare in 1918. It also looks in detail at the war at sea and in the air, and considers the aftermath and legacy of the First World War.

This volume places the history of the Second World War and the Baltic states into a multidisciplinary and international perspective. It includes contributions from the fields of diplomacy, strategy, military operations, intelligence and propaganda. It presents not only a multi-layered interpretation of a region affected by total war, but also reveals a great deal about the nature of that conflict. It discusses the attitudes of the great powers towards small states, the nature of military operations around the advent of mechanization and close air support, and techniques of population control and of steering opinion in the era of ideological regimes. Contributions on these topics add to our understanding of the Second World War as a pivotal event in the history of Europe in the 20th century.